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ABSTRACT 
Using the network of university classmates among corporate directors 
and politicians and the regression discontinuity design of close gubernatorial 
elections from 1999 to 2010, we identify the positive and significant impact of 
social-network based political connections on firm value. Firms connected to 
elected governors increase value by 1.36% on average surrounding the election 
date. Political connections are more valuable in a state with a higher level of 
regulation and corruption, in smaller firms, and in firms dependent on external 
finance. Firms connected to election winners invest more, earn better operating 
performance, hold more cash, and enjoy better long-term stock performance.  
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1. INTRODUCTION
Do political connections impact firm value? The answer to this question wields crucial 
implications for shareholder value, corporate governance, institutional design, and incentive 
mechanisms for politicians and firms. Although abundant anecdotal evidence in the media 
suggests positive benefits of political connections, it remains a challenging task to prove, 
disprove, or generalize the relationship between political connections and firm value. As with 
many topics in corporate finance, any study of political connections will have to overcome the 
endogeneity issue which prevents the precise identification and quantification of their impact.1
Addressing these challenges, we investigate the value of political connections in the U.S., 
where institutions rank among the best, and the line between politics and business among the 
clearest.
 
In the U.S., the rarity of direct links of ownership or concurrent employment between 
corporations and politicians due to the strict regulations and disclosure regime, as well as a high 
level of transparency, makes it even more challenging to identify potential political connections 
and gather sufficient data and observations for empirical studies. 
2
First, we define political connections broadly by following a social network approach, as 
proposed by Bertrand et al. (2008), Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2008), Fracassi (2009), Do et al. 
(2012), and Nguyen (2012). A firm is connected to a politician if one of its directors shares the 
same educational background with a politician. The connections from the network of classmates 
and alumni are clearly and unambiguously defined based on publicly available information on 
educational backgrounds of all politicians and directors. This network’s coverage is broad 
enough to be representative of the population of politicians and directors and to avoid obvious 
and specific political connections that are subject to latent conflicts of interest, making it possible 
to generalize the empirical results. Alumni and classmate networks also play an important role in 
the American society. Educational institutions received as much as $41.67 billion in 2010, or 
  Any significant result we might find should, therefore, represent an underestimation of 
the value of political connection in other parts of the world having a lower quality of institutions 
and governance. To this purpose, our paper proposes a few innovations.  
                                                 
1 See Roberts and Whited (2010) for a comprehensive overview of the endogeneity issues in empirical 
corporate finance and their solutions, including Regression Discontinuity Design.   
2 The United States ranks in the first decile in control of corruption, rule of law, and regulatory quality and 
government effectiveness in the World Bank’s World Governance Indicators (Kaufman et al. 2011) in 2000-2008. 
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14% of all charitable donations, second only to religious organizations (the Giving USA 
Foundation, 2011.)3
Second, we propose a new identification strategy. We study a sample of firms connected 
to candidates in close gubernatorial elections. Because the outcomes of such close elections are 
almost random, we can apply a Regression Discontinuity Design framework to investigate the 
impact of political connections on the value of connected firms. We rely on the recent literature 
on Regression Discontinuity Design applied to the events of close elections. Lee (2008) shows 
that close elections can be considered a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD), a natural 
experiment that produces near-randomized-trial identification with extremely good internal 
validity. That is, a connection to a politician elected to office by a small margin is nearly identical 
to a connection to one defeated by a small margin, and can be considered as a randomized 
experiment around the threshold. Moreover, Lee and Lemieux (2010) also show that the 
estimated effect is a Weighted Average Treatment Effect (WATE), thus being generalizable to 
the sample of all politicians with a nonzero chance of experiencing a close election. The strength 
of RDD more than offsets a potential weakness of traditional event studies, in that we correctly 
estimate the value of connection even if the market misestimates the probability of event. Event-
study techniques are still used in our approach only to improve estimation efficiency, and are not 
essential to the results. This empirical design has been widely used in labor, political, and 
development economics (see Lee and Lemieux, 2010), but only recently in corporate finance 
(examples include Chava and Roberts, 2008; Kerr, Lerner, and Schoar, 2010; and Cuñat, Gine, 
and Guadalupe, 2012.) 
 
Third, we suggest a solution to overcome homophily, a common and thorny issue in 
studies of social networks. Homophily, as first defined by sociologists, refers to the phenomenon 
that people sharing the same characteristics are more likely to join the same network, thus 
confounding the effect of connections with the effect of shared characteristics.4
                                                 
3 We abstract from connections based on political contributions (e.g. Cooper et al. 2011) because it is 
difficult to establish clear links between firms and specific politicians. Firms may not make direct contributions. 
They can only initiate independently-run political action committees (PACs), which channel donations from 
employees to both major parties, larger PACs, and usually smaller amounts to specific candidates. In our study, we 
do control for total contributions from all sources. 
 Recent works 
using the social network of educational backgrounds (Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy, 2008; 
4 See McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook (2001). 
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Fracassi 2009; Nguyen 2012) have distinguished between former classmate networks and alumni 
networks to highlight the effect of connections as opposed to that of shared characteristics. By 
including both politicians and directors, we are able to push this methodology further: we 
introduce school fixed effects, thus identifying the effect of political connections by variations 
over time (school fixed effects are unidentifiable in earlier works based solely on the connections 
of businessmen). Because we find that our results remain sensibly similar when controlling for 
school fixed effects, we can ascertain that the discovered effects come from political connections, 
not homophily. 
The RDD equation provides an estimate of the stock-market value of a new connection 
to a politician in the gubernatorial race: the treatment is one that suddenly elects a firm’s 
connected politician as governor, as opposed to leaving him where he is. As shown in Lee and 
Lemieux (2010), the Regression Discontinuity Design in close elections produces a consistent, 
unconfounded estimate of the effect of the treatment. This estimate is in fact as good as a 
randomized experiment around the vote share threshold of 50%, and can account for all 
confounding factors prior to the event, be they observable or unobservable. Therefore, instead 
of running regressions trying to control for all relevant covariates, we can focus our empirical 
work on a single regression, while varying the subsample used in the regression. In the 
terminology of Lee and Lemieux (2010), we estimate the WATE, where the weight of each 
observation is the probability that a politician experiences a very close election. While some 
politicians are less likely to have that experience than others, the inclusion of highly visible 
politicians such as Janet Napolitano in our sample suggests that our estimate can cover a broad 
share of the population of politicians and is therefore generalizable. Taken together, our estimate 
identifies a treatment effect that can shed light on social connections between governors and 
corporate directors. 
We obtain data on gubernatorial elections from 1999 to 2010 from the Federal Election 
Commission, from which we filter in only elections of a winning margin within 5% between the 
winner and the loser. We manually collect details of all politicians’ educational backgrounds from 
the web archives of their campaigns, a process made difficult by the search for less prominent 
defeated candidates. On the director side, we obtain past education history for directors of 
public firms in the U.S. from BoardEx of Management Diagnostics Limited. We then form all 
pairs between close-election candidates (elected or defeated) and directors who graduated from 
the same educational institution (same campus) within one year of each other, and link each pair 
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to the stock performance of the firm around the date of the politician’s close election.5
Our study results in a number of findings. First, we find consistent and robust results 
that political connections are valuable to firm value. Firms connected to the winner in a close 
gubernatorial election experience a positive and significant average cumulative abnormal return 
(CAR) of 1.36% over and above the CAR of firms connected to the loser. The effect is robust to 
alternative specifications in the event windows and in the market models, and across sub-samples. 
Second, we find that the value of political connections vary across states and firms. Political 
connections are more valuable in a state with a higher level of regulation, higher level of 
corruption, and higher population concentration in the state’s capital. Political connections are 
also more valuable in small firms, in firms that rely more on external finance, and in firms with 
some activities in the politician’s state prior to the election. Third, we find that political 
connection wield real impact on firm behavior. Following close elections, firms connected to the 
winner invest significantly more than do firms connected to the loser. They become more 
profitable and hoard more cash. Their stock prices also perform better over the long term.                 
 Each 
observation thus matches a firm’s cumulative abnormal return on the event window to the win 
or loss status of the candidate who shares an educational background with a director of the firm. 
Our paper contributes to finance literature in several ways. First, we propose a new 
approach to measuring political connections based on social networks of candidates to 
governorship and directors of listed firms. This approach allows us to have a relatively sizable 
sample of U.S. firms for our study and to avoid obvious and specific connections. We thus 
enrich the recent finance literature that provides evidence on the impact of social ties on 
numerous finance issues (Barber et al. 1995; Barber and Palmer, 2001; Cohen, Frazzini, and 
Malloy, 2008; Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Lu, 2007, 2010; Schmidt, 2008; Allen et Babus 2009; 
Kuhnen, 2009; Jackson 2009; Do et al. 2012; Nguyen 2012.) 
Second, we propose a solution to the identification problem. Extant literature studies 
extensively the value of political connections through events that happen independently of 
political connections. Knight (2007), Goldman, Rocholl, and So (2008, 2009), and  Mattozzi 
(2008) exploit close elections in presidential races in the U.S.; Roberts (1990), Jayachandran 
(2006), Fisman et al. (2006), and Blanes i Vidal et al. (forthcoming) use news and events related 
to prominent American politicians; while Fisman (2001), Johnson and Mitton (2003), 
                                                 
5 We do not construct links between people previously working in the same firm, as only a few in our 
sample of politicians have previously worked in a publicly listed firm. 
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Bunkanwanicha and Wiwattanakantang (2009), Ferguson and Voth (2008), and Imai and Shelton 
(2010) treat politically important events in Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Nazi Germany, and 
Taiwan. This strategy avoids the direct reverse causation channel, but, as discussed by Snowberg, 
Wolfers, and Zitzewitz (2007, 2008), many caveats persist, notably the unobserved prior 
probability of each event. The use of prediction markets as a helpful fix is unfortunately only 
limited to important events such as American presidential elections; it thus restricts the scope 
and undermines the generalizability of such analysis. Other studies using non-political firm-
related events such as appointments of directors (Faccio, 2006; Goldman, Rocholl, and So, 
2009), bailouts (Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell, 2006), IPOs (Fan, Wong, and Zhang, 2007; 
Francis, Hasan, and Sun, 2009) are subject to the endogeneity concern that these events are 
partly triggered by certain unobservable characteristics of the firms. Other papers, such as 
Khwaja and Mian (2005); Dinç (2005); Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee (2006); Bertrand et al. (2008); 
Claessens, Feijen, and Laeven (2008); Li et al. (2008); and Boubakri, Cosset, and Saffar (2009), 
rely on fixed effects and/or difference-in-difference strategies and thus are prone to biases 
induced by time-varying characteristics of firms or politicians/political parties. 
While prior papers have carried out various robustness checks to verify the causality 
channel, few treat the endogeneity of connections. The possibility of unobserved firm 
characteristics affecting both corporate outcomes and political connections are extremely hard to 
rule out. As detailed in the following section, our framework deals adequately with both the 
endogeneity of the connected politician and the selection bias in networks due to homophily, 
providing a powerful internal validity of the empirical results. Moreover, the estimated effect is a 
WATE across the sample of all politicians susceptible to experiencing a close election, and across 
sampled firms, which are comparable to Compustat’s universe. The discovered results are 
therefore also externally valid. That is, it is possible to generalize the conclusions to the 
population of all firms and politicians. 
Our third contribution is the finding of a consistent positive impact of political 
connection on firm value in the U.S. This result complements international evidence of the value 
of political connection in extant literature (e.g., Fisman, 2001; Faccio, 2006; Faccio et al 2006), 
and enrich evidence from the U.S. (e.g., Goldman, Rocholl, and So, 2008). Our finding is also 
consistent with recent research from Do et al. (2012), who find that firms lose benefits when the 
connected politician moves from state to federal politics.  
The remaining paper is organized as follows. Section 2 details the methodology. Section 
3 provides data description. Section 4 reports the empirical results. Section discusses the 
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channels and interpretations of the results. Section 6 studies the real impact of political 
connections on firms. Section 6 reports robustness checks. Section 8 concludes. 
2. IDENTIFICATION AND EMPIRICAL DESIGN 
An estimation of the impact of political connections on firm value should overcome a 
reverse causation channel when a well-performing firm may be able to help its connected 
politicians win elections, or an omitted variable bias when connected firms and politicians are 
affected by the same unobservable factor, such as a shift in public opinion. The reverse causation 
and endogeneity bias are best eliminated with a randomization of the assignment of a politician 
to office. If the politician is chosen randomly, no concern exists about either the reverse 
causation of firm value changes or the influence of some omitted variables. It is, however, 
extremely difficult to find a randomized experiment on political connection. Lee’s (2008) 
pioneering work on Regression Discontinuity Designs (RDD) shows that the event of winning 
close to the vote threshold of 50% is randomized between the winner and the loser as in a 
randomized experiment, and that conditional on the election being close, the incidence of 
winning or losing is independent of all observable and unobservable characteristics of the 
politician before the election. The RDD thus allows an estimation of the average treatment effect 
of connections to elected politicians versus defeated politicians without any reverse causation or 
omitted variable bias, ensuring the internal validity of the results. Results from the RDD are also 
externally valid and generalizable. Lee and Lemieux (2010) point out that the RDD estimate is 
not only informative for close elections but also for all elections. The estimate can be interpreted 
as a weighted average treatment effect of being politically connected, where each politician’s 
weight is her ex ante likelihood to be in a close gubernatorial election, which is nontrivial for 
most American politicians. Even very powerful politicians can be subject to close gubernatorial 
elections, as Arizona’s Janet Napolitano experienced in 2002. 
Our identification strategy has a key advantage in comparison with event studies. 
Traditional event studies rely on the event’s exogeneity and the accuracy of the market’s prior 
beliefs, unavailable except in prediction markets (see discussions in Fisman, 2001, and Snowberg 
et al., 2008). In contrast, our design is always valid even if the market’s prior belief is largely 
incorrect. Indeed, suppose that the market believes in a winning probability of 65% instead of 
the correct probability of 50%. For $100 of perceived value of winning, the pre-event connection 
will be priced by the market, incorrectly, at $65. The post-event market reaction to a realized win 
is $35, and that to a realized loss is negative $65. An event study focused on election wins may 
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report the underestimated value of $35.6
In addition to the cross-sectional identification by RDD, time-series identification from 
event-study market models is used to calculate stocks’ Cumulated Abnormal Returns (CARs). 
However, while the use of CARs improves estimation efficiency by reducing market noises, it is 
not essential to our results, thanks to the near-random nature of RDD assignments.  
 However, RDD estimation still produces, correctly, the 
difference of $35-(-$65) = $100, exactly the right value of having a connection to an elected 
politician. (See the appendix and Lee and Lemieux, 2010, for more details.) 
We design two main econometric specifications to estimate the effect of political 
connection. Each observation represents a connection between a close-election top-two 
candidate and a connected firm’s director through a specific university program for a given 
election year. The dependent variable is a connected firm’s cumulated abnormal return (CAR) in 
a window around the election day. We thus combine the strength of event studies with RDD to 
reduce market noses in stock returns. The treatment variable is an indicator for whether a firm is 
connected to the winner in a close race. 
Following Lee and Lemieux (2010), the first specification that we mainly use is an OLS 
regression of the outcome variable (CAR) on the treatment variable (WinLose), controlling for 
the vote shares of elected politicians and defeated politicians, where the sample is limited to all 
races with a vote margin smaller than 5%. That is, we obtain the OLS estimate ?̂? in the following 
equation, where 𝑉𝑆𝑖 stands for vote share: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝛽𝑊𝑖𝑛𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑖 + 𝛿𝑊𝑉𝑆𝑖𝟏{𝑉𝑆𝑖≥50%} + 𝛿𝐿𝑉𝑆𝑖𝟏{𝑉𝑆𝑖<50%} + 𝜀𝑖. 
The treatment variable WinLose is an indicator that is equal to one if a firm is connected 
to the winner and to zero if a firm is connected to the loser in a close election. Standard errors 
are calculated from the OLS regression, and are clustered at the politician level for each election. 
In our robustness checks, we also include a cubic polynomial of the vote shares, as well as other 
levels of clustering. 
We also perform robustness checks using nonparametric regressions of the outcome 
variable on the treatment variable on two separate subsamples, of elected politicians and of 
                                                 
6 A more sophisticated study may report $35/50% = $70, assuming market’s prior at 50%. Without 
knowledge of the market’s belief, no event study could estimate the correct value of $100. 
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runners-up. Predictions of the outcome variable are calculated at the threshold of 50% for each 
sample, and their difference is reported. Technically, we run nonparametric local (cubic) 
polynomial regressions of the equation: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝐹(𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖) + 𝜀𝑖 
on the subsample where 𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖 < 50% to estimate the function 𝐹�−(. ) and on the 
subsample where 𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖 > 50% to obtain 𝐹�+(. ). The estimated effect is calculated as 
𝐹�+(50%) − 𝐹�−(50%).7
Our connections based on all pairs of classmates might raise doubts about the realistic 
nature of those connections, as in real life most people have only a small number of friends even 
among classmates (see, for instance, Leider et al. 2009). Yet classmate connection levels should 
not be a concern to the significance of our results. The measurement errors in this case imply 
that the effect of real friendships is nuanced by many non-friends classmate connections, thus 
produces an attenuation bias that reduces the absolute size of the estimate and its statistical 
significance. The effect of real friendships can thus be even larger than those found in this paper. 
On the other hand, classmate connections can be primordial in the development of relationships 
after college or graduate school by providing the conditions for common communication and 
mutual trust as well as common access to the same social network. Former classmates are thus 
more likely to later develop a strong connection, even if they were not close friends while in 
college or graduate school. Several recent papers have shown the strength of this measurement 
of connections in many contexts (e.g., Cohen, Frazzini, Malloy, 2008; Fracassi, 2009; and 
Nguyen, 2012). 
 
While the links between firms and elected governors are identified as an almost-random 
treatment in our context, this definition of social network still tolerates the problem of 
homophily (e.g., McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook, 2001). Future politicians and directors 
sharing similar characteristics and preferences may have been drawn together at the same 
university. Decades later, the elected politician may enact policies in favor of these same 
characteristics, on which the connected firms can profit, without passing through the social 
                                                 
7  The standard error of this estimate is calculated as the standard error of the difference of two 
independent variables, 𝐹�+(50%) and 𝐹�+(50%), as the two subsamples are completely separate from one another. 
The standard errors for 𝐹�+(50%) and 𝐹�−(50%) come from nonparametric regressions. 
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network channel. In a nutshell, unobservable factors could determine these connections, 
politician’s preferences, firms’ activities, and stock price reaction to elections. For instance, if a 
politician and a director went to a university that specializes in military studies, then the election 
of the former has the potential to affect the latter’s firm value through new defense policies, 
rather than through the social network. Thus, identification problems of the effect in question 
emerge when certain unobservables influence both the outcomes at the firm level and the 
explanatory variable of political connection. While the RDD does identify the effect of “political 
connection” as we define it, this effect may not be the fruit of social network mechanisms but 
may instead result from common characteristics. Our empirical framework allows for a simple 
solution. The common, time-invariant characteristics of school cohorts can be captured by 
school fixed effects. The estimated effect is then identified across years and by individuals who 
went to more than one school. As reported later, our results are not affected by the inclusion of 
school fixed effects. Our results are thus robust after controlling for the potential impact of 
homophily. 
In summary, our research design identifies and consistently estimates the WATE of 
being connected to a candidate to a gubernatorial election, where the effect is averaged with 
weights over the sample of all politicians who stand a chance of experiencing a close election, 
and all firms in Compustat. 
3. DATA DESCRIPTION 
We construct our sample using data from several sources. First, we collect the 
gubernatorial election results from the Federal Election Committee (FEC) website. For each 
election, we identify the candidates finishing first (the winner) and second (the loser) and 
calculate the margin of votes between them. A close election is specified by a margin of votes of 
less than 5%. As reported in Panel A of Table 1, we identify 35 close gubernatorial elections in 
the U.S. between 1999 and 2010. The average Win/Loss margin across all elections is 2.70%. 
Panel B reports characteristic of connected firms in our sample and compares them to firms in 
the Compustat universe. The sample’s firm average market capitalization is $2.98 billion, with a 
maximum of $259.91 billion and a median of $0.52 billion, which are fairly comparable to 
average Compustat firms ($2.41 billion, $467.09 billion, and $0.25 billion, respectively). Our 
average firm has a market-to-book ratio of 3.95 (Tobin’s Q of 2.03) and age of 9.90 years, as 
compared to a market-to-book ratio of 4.79 (Tobin’s Q of 2.28) and age of 8.32 years for an 
average Compustat firm. 
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[Insert Table 1 Here] 
Panel C reports the time series of close gubernatorial elections and of connected firms 
per year. The average annual number of gubernatorial elections is 13.08 (with a maximum of 37, 
and minimum of 2). The average annual number of close gubernatorial elections is 2.92 (with a 
maximum of 11, and minimum of 0). Our sample of connected firms includes 63 firms per year, 
on average, with a maximum of 263 firms, and a minimum of 1 firm. Our sample represents 
1.01% of the total number of listed firms and 2.15% of the total market capitalization in the 
Compustat dataset. 
We hand-collect the biographical record of these elections using Marquis Who’s Who 
biographies, which contain active and inactive biographies from the Who’s Who publications. Our 
scope of search includes biographies in (i) Who’s Who in American Politics, (ii) World Almanac of 
U.S. Politics, and (iii) The Almanac of American Politics. For each candidate, Who’s Who biographies 
provide a brief vita, including the candidate’s employment history, all undergraduate and 
graduate degrees attained, the year in which those degrees were awarded, and the awarding 
institution. Most of the biographies for our sample are available in Who’s Who. To complete our 
biographies, we use politicians’ archived websites, and other sources on the World Wide Web. 
We retain entries for which we can positively identify the politician.  
Next, we obtain biographical information and past education history for directors and 
senior company officers from BoardEx of Management Diagnostics Limited. The data details 
the relational links among board directors and senior company officers for both active and 
inactive firms by cross-referencing these directors’ and officers’ employment histories, 
educational backgrounds, and professional qualifications. In particular, the data contains current 
and past roles of each official in a company, with start and end date (year), all undergraduate and 
graduate degrees attained, the year in which those degrees were awarded, and the awarding 
institution. We restrict our sample to board directors in U.S. publicly listed firms. 
We construct our social network measure through educational institutions. We define a 
political connection as a link between a firm’s director and an election candidate who both 
graduate from the same university program within a year. We thereby match institutions and 
degrees on Who’s Who biographies and BoardEx. Following Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2008), 
we group the degrees into six categories: (i) business school (Master of Business Administration), 
(ii) medical school, (iii) general graduate (Master of Arts or Master of Science), (iv) Doctor of 
Philosophy, (v) law school, and (vi) general undergraduate. To identify a politician’s alumni 
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network, we relax the restriction on year of graduation. Finally, we match our data to stock 
return data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). 
Panel D reports the distribution of common educational backgrounds of corporate 
directors and gubernatorial candidates in our sample. Degrees for undergraduate studies seem to 
be the most important to the connection of directors and politicians: 69.12% of politicians and 
86.94% of directors are connected through their undergraduate studies, having graduated from 
the same school/university within one year. The figures are 16.18% and 4.81% for law school; 
5.88% and 6.02% for business school. Doctoral degrees appear to be insignificant in connecting 
politicians to directors. Only 2.94% of politicians and 1.37% of directors are connected through 
Ph.D. programs. 
4. EMPIRICAL
In this section, we report our main empirical results of our regression discontinuity 
design as well as the results on the impact of political connections on firm value across many 
sub-samples. 
 RESULTS 
4.1. POLITICAL CONNECTIONS AND FIRM VALUE IN A REGRESSION DISCONTINUITY DESIGN  
Table 2 presents our estimation of the impact of political connection on firm value by 
relating stock price Cumulated Abnormal Returns (CAR) of connected firms around the election 
day to the win/lose status of the connected politician. Each observation pairs a firm’s director to 
a candidate in a close gubernatorial election, both of whom graduate from the same university 
program within a year (Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy, 2008). We calculate CAR for every 
connected firm during a standard 3-day event period, from day -1 to day +1. The event day (day 
0) is the election day reported by the Federal Election Commission, which is always a trading 
day. We first follow a conventional event study method to calculate the abnormal returns 
resulting from close elections by assuming a single-factor model with the beta estimated from the 
pre-event window, and later use other methods of CAR estimation as robustness checks. We 
exploit the RDD of close elections in which the winning margin is within a 5% vote share. We 
control for the vote shares separately for winners and losers, as suggested by Lee and Lemieux 
(2010), to obtain the effect at the exact threshold of 50%. 
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
We find an overall average significant and positive effect of connection to a close 
election’s winner on CARs. Columns 1 and 2 report that firms connected to the winners exhibit 
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CARs which are 3.23% and 1.77% higher than CARs of firms connected to the losers at the 1% 
and 3% winning margin, respectively. All the coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% 
level. Column 3 shows our benchmark specification (vote share margin of 5% or less, controlling 
separately for winners’ and losers’ vote shares). We obtain a positive estimate of 1.36%, 
significant at the 5% level. In regression reported in Columns 4 to 6, we controls for election 
characteristics (dummy variables for the party, gender, incumbency, Senate/House race) and firm 
characteristics (market capitalization, Tobin's Q, return on asset, and leverage), respectively. We 
find positive estimates of 1.63%, 1.48%, and 1.76%, respectively, significant at the 5% level, 
which are of comparable magnitudes to our estimate in column 3.  
If a strong homophily factor pertains in the formation of the school networks that we 
consider, including fixed effects for educational institutions, however, may substantially affect 
the main estimate, as discussed in the previous section. Controlling for school fixed effects, 
column 8 of Table 2 produces an estimate of 1.38%, significant at 1%, which is similar in 
magnitude to our main estimate in column 3. It implies that network homophily is relatively 
irrelevant to our treatment. 
In columns 7 and 9, we control for the year fixed effect and the industry fixed effect 
respectively. We obtain positive estimates of 1.25% and 1.54%, significant at the 5% level, which 
are of similar magnitude and statistical significance to our benchmark’s estimate in column 3.   
It is worth noting that columns 4 to 10 generate comparable results to those in column 3 
after controlling for many other factors, year fixed effect, school fixed effect, and year and 
industry fixed effect. This outcome is expected from RDD regression framework under which 
the main estimate should not be affected by “irrelevant covariates.”8
Although polls’ methods and timing might raise questions about the quality of their 
predictive power, the existence of pre-election polls might mitigate our results, if they can exactly 
predict election outcomes. We thus browse all the polls before our close elections and control 
 Indeed, when the treatment 
is comparable to a randomized experiment, any additional control variable must be independent 
of the treatment, thus its inclusion should not significantly alter the estimate of the treatment 
effect. Unobservable characteristics of the election year or the industry seem to be irrelevant 
covariates and thus do not alter much our main estimate. Our main results are not driven by any 
year-specific or industry-specific unobservables. 
                                                 
8 In fact, RDD accounts for all observable and unobservable characteristics, as discussed in the appendix. 
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for poll predictions. Column 10 repeats our main regression, as in column 3, controlling for poll 
predictions. We obtain an estimate of 1.26% on the WinLose dummy, comparable to the 
estimate of 1.36% in column 3. When we retain polls with prediction margins of 5% or less, the 
corresponding sample includes 338 connected firms. We run the same regression and report 
results in column 11 of Table 2. We find an estimate of 1.84%, significant at the 5% level. 
Overall, the existence of poll prediction does not affect our RDD results.      
The large variation in the cross-sectional distribution of CARs might bias our results. As 
a check, we exclude all CARs exceeding 30% in absolute value from our sample and re-run our 
benchmark regression. Column 12 shows an estimate of 1.66%, significant at 1%, which is larger 
than the estimate of 1.36% in column 3.  
In summary, Table 2 provides evidence that firms connected to the winner in a close 
gubernatorial election between 1999 and 2010, as compared to firms connected to the loser, 
experience significant gain in firm value. Our regression discontinuity design results are robust 
and consistent when we control for politicians’ characteristics, firm size, election year, industry 
and school fixed effects. Our estimated average CAR of 1.36% for our sample of U.S. firms 
appears to be slightly smaller, but comparable in magnitude to Faccio (2006), who reports an 
average CAR of 1.43% from a cross-country sample of firms experiencing an event of new 
political connection. Meanwhile, our estimate is significantly smaller in magnitude than the 
estimate from Goldman, Rocholl, and So (2009), who report a difference in CARs of 8.97% 
between Republican-connected and Democrat-connected firms following the 2000 U.S. 
presidential election. 
4.2.  CANDIDATE CHARACTERISTICS AND THE VALUE OF POLITICAL CONNECTIONS   
The previous section provides evidence of an overall positive impact of network-based 
political connections on firm value. In the following sections, we investigate if this effect varies. 
Based on prior literature, we advance the following predictions:          
Prediction 1: Candidate characteristics may determine the value of political connections. 
Prediction 2: In states with stronger institutional checks and balances, firms receive 
fewer benefits from their state-level political connections. 
Prediction 3: Firm with activities in the connected politician’s state should benefit more 
from the connections.  
Prediction 4: Firm characteristics may determine the value of political connections. 
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We will test those predictions on various subsamples along the lines of candidate 
characteristics, institution quality measures, career backgrounds of politicians, and firm size and 
activities. We run the benchmark regression in each subsample and compare the estimates. The 
following subsections detail the corresponding results. 
We start by investigating whether the positive impact of political connections varies with 
the candidates’ characteristics. Our identification strategy is based on close gubernatorial 
elections from 1999 to 2010. As the politicians come from different backgrounds, serve different 
missions, and wield potentially different forms of influence, we might expect the value of a firm’s 
connection to different politicians to vary. We thus divide our samples into subsamples of firms 
depending on characteristics of politicians. Table 3 summarizes our results.  
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
We first explore whether a candidate’s position as incumbent or challenger in a close 
election and her prior political experience affect our results by partitioning the sample 
accordingly. Regression results in columns 1 and 2 show that firms connected to the winner 
experience significant gain of value, independently of whether the winner is a challenger or an 
incumbent. However, the effect appears larger for firms connected to incumbents (1.9%) than 
for firms connected to challengers (1.2%). In column 3, in which we run regression on a sub-
sample of firms connected to politicians who are both challengers in close elections (the 
incumbent might retire for good or move to a federal office), we find an estimate coefficient of 
1.46%, significant at the 5% level. This indicates that, in close elections that involve two new 
candidates, firms connected to the winning challenger experience an increase in firm value of 
1.46% in comparison to firms connected to the losing challenger. Connections to the winner of a 
close election thus enhance firm value.             
Our measure of social networks is based on the network between directors and 
politicians. As non-executive directors and executive directors are supposed to assume different 
tasks, we repeat our tests in subsamples of connections through non-executive directors and 
executive directors. We find that, as reported in columns 4 and 5, firms connected to a politician 
through one of its non-executive directors experience a significant gain of value (1.36%), while 
the impact is positive but not significant in firms connected to a politician through an executive 
director.  
To investigate whether the value of political connection depends on the politician’s party 
affiliation, we further explore the subsamples of firms connected to the Democrats and the 
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Republicans, respectively, in columns 6 and 7. In both cases, the estimates are positive (2.01% 
and 0.18%, respectively) but only statistically significant at the 5% level for a subsample of firms 
connected to Democratic candidates. This result seems to indicate that connections to a 
Democratic candidate create more value to firms.   
The impact of political connection on firm value may also depend on the importance of 
the networks. We investigate this direction by checking the estimates across different network 
sizes. We sort the educational institutions by the number of observations in the sample, as it is 
important to look at the number of prominent graduates that rise to the top in business and 
politics, and not just at any graduate from the same year. Intuitively, when a network is better 
represented in the sample, its links are arguably stronger in Granovetter’s (1974) sense, in that 
each pair shares more common connections. Such a network has a higher measure of network 
closure, according to Karlan et al. (2009), and is more conducive to agreements that require 
commitments between pairs in the network. Karlan et al. (2009) show, in contrast, that a low 
closure network provides better incentives for information sharing. Columns 8 and 9 report 
estimates of 2.22% and 0.82%, significant at the 5% level, for both subsamples of connections 
that are below (small network) and above (large network) the median number of observations, 
respectively. It appears that political connections are valuable in both small and large networks. 
Consistent with extant literature on social networks (for example, Granovetter, 1974), the value 
of political connections is greater in smaller networks.     
Politicians with or without political and professional experience at the federal level might 
contribute differently to firm value. We collect information on the positions candidates have 
held up to election and classify two categories of politicians whose main occupation in the 
election year was in a public office at federal level or not. Columns 10 and 11 of Table 3 report 
the benchmark estimates by the corresponding subsamples that distinguish between firms 
connected to candidates coming from positions at the federal level (for instance, in a senator’s 
office) and others. We find positive estimates of 3.56% and 1.32%, significant at the 5% and 
10% levels, respectively. The results indicate that the magnitude of the value of political 
connections is higher for candidates with federal experience.  
In summary, Table 3 shows that our finding—that connections to a politician in a close 
election induce a significant gain in firm value—appears to be consistent and robust across 
several subsamples of firms connected to candidates with different characteristics. While the 
impact of political connections on firm value is generally positive and significant, the magnitude 
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seems to be larger for firms connected to incumbent candidates, to non-executive directors, to 
Democratic candidates, and candidates from federal offices. 
4.3. STATE'S REGULATION, CORRUPTION, INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY, AND THE VALUE 
OF POLITICAL CONNECTIONS  
Apart from politicians’ backgrounds, a state’s characteristics might also impact the value 
of political connections. States with better checks and balances should be associated with lower 
value of political connections. This is our Prediction 2. Table 4 reports variations on the value of 
political connections as a function of various state characteristics.  
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
Columns 1 and 2 distinguish between politicians’ states having more or less than median 
regulations. The index of regulation by state is measured for 1999 in Clemson University’s 
Report on Economic Freedom, http://freedom.clemson.edu. This report combines information 
on labor and environmental regulations and regulations in specific industries such as insurance. 
As expected, we find a positive estimate, significant at the 1% level, in states with more 
regulations, where the potential is greater for politicians to grant benefits to connected firms on a 
discretionary basis. The estimate is still positive, but insignificant for states with a lower level of 
regulations. 
In columns 3 and 4, we use an alternative proxy for the level of state regulations from 
Heritage Foundation. This variable measures the level of state economic freedom. We classify 
states into two categories (low vs. high economic freedom) based on the median of this index. 
We obtain positive estimates of 4.82%, significant at the 5% level, and of 0.68%, insignificant, 
respectively, for the two sub-samples. The results appear to support our Prediction 2 that the 
value of political connections is significantly higher in more-regulated states.             
In columns 5 and 6, we divide our sample into subsamples according to whether a state’s 
government employment is beyond or below the median national level and re-run our 
benchmark regression. We find a positive estimate of 3%, significant at the 1% level, and a 
positive and insignificant estimate, respectively, for these two subsamples. This result indicates 
that political connections are more valuable to firms in states with more government 
employment.             
Columns 7 to 8 divide states by levels of corruption. The most commonly used measure 
of state-level corruption comes from Glaeser and Saks (2006), who extract actual conviction data 
from the Department of Justice’s “Report to Congress on the Activities and Operations of the 
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Public Integrity Section” to form a measure of the ratio of convicted corruption cases by 
population size, averaged from 1976 to 2002 to remove periodical noises. Results also support 
our intuition: political connections are more valuable in more corrupt states than in less corrupt 
states. The effect is clearly stronger in magnitude and statistically significant (1.86%, significant at 
the 1% level) in more corrupt states, and positive but insignificant in less corrupt states. 
As actual conviction cases only amount to a small fraction of real corrupt deals, in 
columns 9 and 10, we use an alternative measure of corruption based on Saiz and Simonsohn’s 
(2008) approach of “downloading wisdom from online crowds.” We use the dataset of all 
newspapers gathered in Newslibrary.com to search for the word “corruption” close to the state 
name, then normalize the resulting number of search hits by that for the state name alone. We 
find that the value of political connections is positive and significant in more corrupt states, 
while it is non-significant in less corrupt ones. The estimate on more corrupt states is 2.28%, 
fairly comparable to the estimate of 1.86% from column 7.    
While the RDD correctly identifies the value of political connections, it is harder to 
ascertain that its variation across states is caused by the differences in institutional quality. While 
we avoid direct reverse causation by using some measures calculated before 2000, the results are 
still exposed to endogenous selection by unobservables, such as historical or cultural factors, that 
may cause both institution quality and the value of political connections across states. In 
columns 11 and 12 we control for this problem by using GCISC, a measure of population 
concentration around the state capital city in 1970. As shown by Campante and Do (2012), this 
measure is strongly predictive of state-level corruption across American states (higher 
concentration around state capital implies better media coverage of state politics and, therefore, 
less corruption). This measure is highly persistent over time and, arguably, not directly affected 
by unobservable determinants of corruption. The results from columns 11 and 12 support our 
prediction. The estimated effect is positive (2.59%) and statistically significant (at the 1% level) 
among states of lower-than-median population concentration, and positive and insignificant for 
other states. 
In sum, Table 4 provides evidence that the estimated value effect of political connection 
is of higher magnitude in more corrupt states, in states with more regulations and worse 
institutions, with a higher level of government employment, and with higher population 
concentration in its capital. These results support our Prediction 2. 
4.4. FIRM CHARACTERISTICS AND THE VALUE OF POLITICAL CONNECTIONS  
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We now study firm characteristics as potential determinants of the relationship between 
political connections and firm value, and detail results in Table 5. 
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
Columns 1 and 2 report regression results on two subsamples of firms whose market 
capitalization is respectively above or below the median level in our sample. The difference 
between those results indicates that smaller politically connected firms experience greater gain of 
value when the connected politician wins a gubernatorial election (gain of 1.22% for smaller 
firms, significant at 10%, as compared with an insignificant effect among larger firms.) Put 
differently, political connections are more important for small firms. Larger firms may be 
connected to many politicians, and the financial benefit of connection to one more politician 
may only represent a small fraction of the firm’s value; hence, for larger firms, the effect should 
be smaller. 
Another potential benefit of political connections is easier access to finance, as shown by 
Khwaja and Mian (2005). We test this conjecture by investigating whether the value of political 
connection is associated with a firm’s dependence on external finance. We construct Rajan and 
Zingales’s (1998) measure of dependence on external finance by 3-digit SIC industries as the 
industry average of (CapEx – Cashflow from Operations)/CapEx, then divide our sample into 
industries with above and below median scores. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 5 report our standard 
regression results on these two sub-samples. Connected firms relying more on external finance 
exhibit a coefficient on the WinLose dummy of 1.56% and significant at the 5% level; in contrast, 
for connected firms with less dependence on external finance, the estimated effect is positive but 
insignificant at conventional levels. Firms that are financially independent seem not to be 
affected after election results. 
The estimated effect appears to be particularly strong when determinants are interacted. 
For example, columns 5 and 6 show that small connected firms in more corrupt states 
experience more positive stock price reaction than do large firms in more corrupt states. The 
estimates are 2.95%, significant at the 1% level, and 0.54%, insignificant, respectively. This result 
supports our Prediction 2. 
The benefits of political connections at the state level might be larger for a firm with 
important operations in a state. A more direct test of this conjecture should be based on the firm 
activities at the state level. Unfortunately, systematic data on firm activities by state and year, 
measured either by sales or investment, are unavailable. We surmount this difficulty by providing 
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a new measure of firm activities by state and year. We follow Saiz and Simonsohn’s (2008) idea 
of “downloading wisdom” by searching each company’s name through local newspapers in the 
connected politician’s state within each year, using Newslibrary.com; we then normalize the 
number of search hits on firms by the search hits for the neutral keyword “September” across 
the same set of newspapers. The resulting hit rate is used as a proxy of a firm’s activities within a 
state in a year before an election. We run our regressions on subsamples of connected firms 
without and with some state-level activities as reported in columns 7 and 8. We find that firms 
connected to the winner with some state-level activities prior to the election enjoy positive and 
significant stock price reaction over firms connected to the loser with no state-level activities 
prior to the election. The WinLose coefficients are 1.46%, significant at the 5% level, and 0.72%, 
insignificant, respectively.         
Our results show that social-network based political connections significantly enhance 
firm value. One might ask if and how investors are aware of these connections. Note that our 
framework does not require that all investors know about the connection. Reaction from a 
limited number of interested investors might be sufficient to drive our results. To put it 
differently, we may under-estimate the true impact of political connections. As further evidence 
of the interest from investors on close elections, we divide our sample into two subsamples of 
firms with below- and above-zero abnormal trading activity around the election day, following 
Campbell and Wasley’s (1996) approach, and re-run our benchmark regression. Results are 
reported in columns 9 and 10. In terms of CARs, firms with a positive abnormal trading activity 
that are connected to winners outperform firms with a positive abnormal trading activity that are 
connected to losers by 2.14% surrounding the election window. The impact on firms with no 
abnormal trading activity is insignificant.       
In summary, the examination of firm characteristics, as shown in Table 5, provides 
further evidence that certain firms benefit from political connections more than others. The 
evidence provides support to our Prediction 3 and Prediction 4.   
5. CHANNELS, MECHANISMS, AND INTERPRETATIONS OF THE RESULTS  
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is among the first to study the value of political 
connection at local (state) levels. Our primary objective is not to study a concrete channel that 
explains the value impact of political connections, but to focus on an identification strategy to 
establish robust results and to provide evidence that political connections do change firm 
behavior. Our understanding is that one cannot provide exhaustive answer to these questions. 
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This Section will thus discuss the question of the channels in the literature and in our context, 
with further evidence. 
5.1. THE VALUE OF POLITICAL CONNECTIONS: THE CHANNELS  
  As discuss in Section 1, prior literature already provide several channels and 
mechanisms that make political connections valuable to firms, with each paper focusing on one 
channel. For example, Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell (2006) provide evidence that politically 
connected firms have preferential financing in that they are more likely to receive financial 
bailouts. A low or free cost of financing will certainly reduce a firm’s cost of capital and thus 
increases firm value. Goldman, Rocholl, and So (2008) show that S&P500 firms that are 
politically connected to the winning party in a House, Senate or Presidential election are more 
likely to experience an increase in government procurement contracts.  
In our paper, we indirectly investigate several channels that might explain our finding of 
the significant value of political connection. For example, columns 3 and 4 of Table 5 show that 
the value of political connections is greater for firms more dependent on external financing 
(leverage). It is consistent with the argument and evidence from the literature that political 
connection facilitates corporate financing and create value for firms (Faccio et al, (2006), Fan et 
al. (2007) etc.).  
Corruption at state level seems to be another major channel. Columns 7 to 12 of Table 4 
show that, using different proxies for corruption, the value of political connection is positively 
related to the level of state corruption. This evidence is consistent with well-known political 
science common view that state and local politics in the U.S. is more corrupted (thus more 
valuable) than federal politics. Our result indicates that political connections might create value 
to connected firms through illegal and corrupted ways as well. Local politicians might have more 
leverage, for example, in handing local contracts to connected firms. We obtain similar results on 
states that have a high level of regulation which might make connections more crucial in 
obtaining political favors. 
Another piece of evidence in terms of channel from our paper is that columns 9 and 10 
from Table 5 show that firms connected to the winner that experience abnormal trading 
activities surrounding close elections are associated with a significantly higher CAR in 
comparison to firms connected to the loser. This indicates that a number of investors do pay 
attention to the election outcomes and trade on connected firms.       
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5.2. INTERPRETATION OF OUR RESULTS AND FURTHER TESTS OF THE CHANNELS  
One might still be skeptical on why stock prices of a connected firm in one state are 
affected by the outcome of a close gubernatorial election of a connected politician in another 
state which might be far away. Apparently, such connected firms should not be impacted. Why 
should these politicians care about currying favors to connected firms outside their states?      
To address this question, the best and most direct way is to look at each connected firm’s 
operations, such as sales or the number of the firm’s employees in the state where there is a close 
election of a connected politician. As mentioned in our paper, unfortunately these detailed 
corporate operations by states are not readily available. We thus need to find robust proxies. 
Our paper thus follows Saiz and Simonsohn (2008) approach of calculating the number 
of times a firms is reported in local newspapers normalized by the number of search hits for the 
neutral keyword "September” and use it as a proxy for a connected firm’s activities in a state. 
Columns 7 and 8 of Table 5 show that among firms with some activities at state level, firms 
connected to the winner in a close election are associated with a significantly higher CAR. 
Political connections are thus more valuable to a connected firm if this firm is headquarter 
elsewhere but has, for example, a factory, or important sales in a state where the connected 
politician runs for the gubernatorial election. This proxy could be noisy, but we can improve by 
exclude common corporate names such as Apple or normalize by the number of citations in the 
New York Times for example. 
One potential alternative that we are trying is to rely on corporate headquarters and test 
if political connections are more valuable if the close election takes place in the same state of a 
connected firm’s headquarter. The cost to this approach is that the number of observation and 
the power of the empirical test will significantly be reduced. We will present the results in an 
improved version of the paper. 
Another proxy for corporate activities by state is from a recent paper by Garcia and 
Norli (2012). Their proxy is the number of times that a state’s name is cited in the form 10-K 
filed with the SEC. This measure appears to be robust in predicting that investment in truly local 
companies outperforms investment in less local firms. We will present the results in an improved 
version of the paper. 
6. REAL IMPACT OF POLITICAL ON FIRMS  
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Previous sections provide evidence that political connections create value for connected 
firms. However, we do not show the channels of this value creation. In this section, we 
investigate whether political connections enhance firm value through its real impact on corporate 
behavior and outcomes, starting with investment decisions, operating returns, cash holding, and 
long-term performance. Although close elections offer quasi-exogenous changes in political 
connections that allow us to observe many potential effects on the behavior of politically 
connected firms, we cannot exhaust all potential channels.    
6.1   POLITICAL CONNECTIONS AND CORPORATE INVESTMENTS   
Political connections might impact corporate behavior. Although we cannot 
comprehensively provide evidence on every aspect of connected firm, we test this conjecture on 
one of the most important corporate decisions, which is investment. We run OLS regressions of 
the change in firm investments among the politically connected firms around close gubernatorial 
elections in the U.S. between 1999 and 2010 on a WinLose dummy. Firm investing activities in a 
given year are measured as the sum of a firm's capital expenditure and research and development. 
Table 6 summarizes our results.  
[Insert Table 6 Here] 
Columns 1 to 7 show respectively the results with windows from one year before to five 
years after the election year. Columns 1 and 2 report that, in the year before and in the election 
year, firms connected to the winner show no difference in terms of investments in comparison 
to firms connected to the loser. This evidence provides support of the randomness of our 
sample. 
Our most interesting finding is that, one year after a close election, as column 3 shows, 
firms connected to the winners in close elections invest 34.4% more than do firms connected to 
the losers. The impact is significant at the 1% level. Two years and three years after the election, 
as reported in columns 4 and 5, the impact on investment is insignificant. Corporate investments 
significantly decrease in the fourth year, as reported in column 6, and then significantly increase 
by 42.7% in the fifth year, as reported in column 7. Results from column 6 might be explained 
by the inherent uncertainty of the following election, while post-election increase in corporate 
investment in column 7 might happen in the same way as in column 3 when the uncertainty is 
over.        
Overall, results from Table 6 show that political connections impact firm investment 
level, which is one of the most important corporate decisions. Firms connected to winners in 
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close gubernatorial elections significantly increase capital investments immediately following the 
elections (year 1) and in the next election cycle (year 5). Political connections thus wield real 
impact on corporate decisions, such as investment decisions. Our finding is consistent with 
cross-country evidence from Julio and Yook (2012) who show that firm-level investment is 
reduced before and during national election years.    
6.2.   POLITICAL CONNECTIONS AND OPERATING PERFORMANCE   
Prior sections have provided evidence that political connections are valuable to firm 
value based on short term stock price reactions following election results. In this sub-section, we 
investigate whether these connections translate into better operating performance. We re-run our 
benchmark regression with change in operating performance as the dependent variable. Firm 
operating return on assets is measured as operating income before depreciation normalized by 
total assets at the start of the year. Results are reported in Table 7. 
[Insert Table 7 Here] 
It appears that connections to the winner of a close gubernatorial election only translate 
to better operating performance in the medium term. Columns 1 and 2 show that no difference 
exists in operating performance between firms connected to the winner or the loser of a close 
election in the year before, and in the year of, election. This evidence provides support of the 
randomness of our sample.  
Columns 3 and 4 exhibit the same results for the first and the second year post-election. 
In contrast, columns 5 to 7 show that firms connected to the winner start having better 
operation performance than do firms connected to the loser from the third year following a 
close election. The impact is not significant in the third year and is statistically significant in the 
fourth and fifth years. In term of operating income, results from columns 6 and 7 show that 
connected firms to election winners outperform firms connected to election losers by 25.6% and 
33.7% in the in the fourth and fifth years following a close election.     
In sum, results from Table 7 indicate that it takes time for political connections to be 
translated into operating performance following the elections. The explanation might be that 
politically connected firms might enjoy more favorable business with the government, as 
reported in Goldman, Rocholl, and So (2008) that ultimately improves post-election operating 
performance. By contrast, the market might anticipate this impact right after the election and 
incorporate immediately the information into the share price. This might explain the impact of 
political connection on stock price that we find in Tables 2 to 5.  
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6.3. POLITICAL CONNECTIONS AND CORPORATE CASH HOLDING  
Cash reserve is considered in the literature as an important indicator of corporate 
governance. A high level of cash reserve might incite managers to waste corporate resources by 
practicing empire-building investments (Jensen, 1988). Our data allow us to investigate if political 
connections impact connected firms’ corporate cash reserve following close elections. We run 
OLS regressions of the change in firm's cash reserve ratio among the politically connected firms 
around close gubernatorial elections between 1999 and 2010. A firm's cash reserve ratio in a 
given year is measured as the cash balance normalized by total assets. Table 8 reports our results.  
[Insert Table 8 Here] 
Column 1 shows that in the year before the election year, firms connected to the winner 
show no difference in terms of investments than do firms connected to the loser. Again, this 
evidence provides support of the randomness of our sample. Column 2 reports, however, that 
firms connected to the winner hoard significantly more cash just ahead of the election. As 
columns 3 and 4 show, during the first two years after a close election, no significant difference 
in cash holding exists between firms connected to the winner and firms connected to the loser of 
a close election. In contrast, columns 5 and 6 report estimates of 0.88 and 0.93, respectively, 
both significant at the 1% level. Thus, firms connected to the winner start hoarding significantly 
more cash (88% and 93%, respectively) than do firms connected to the loser from year 3 to year 
4 following the elections. Five years after a close election, when a new electoral cycle begins, 
again no significant difference in cash holding exists between firms connected to the winner and 
firms connected to the loser, as column 7 shows. 
In sum, results from Table 8 suggest that firms connected to the winner of a close 
election start hoarding cash three and four years after a close election. One potential explanation 
might be that they fear uncertainty from another close election happening again in the following 
election.    
6.4.  POLITICAL CONNECTIONS AND LONG TERM PERFORMANCE 
Tables 2 to 5 report evidence that political connections are valuable to firm value based 
on post-election short-term stock price reactions. In this sub-section, we investigate whether 
political connections wield the same impact on long-term stock performance. We re-run our 
benchmark regression with change in long-term stock performance as the dependent variable. 
Raw stock returns are cumulated over various time horizons, from six months before to five 
years after the election year. Results are reported in Table 9. 
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[Insert Table 9 Here] 
Columns 1 to 3 show insignificant impact of political connections on stock price 
performance six month before, and one year and two years following, close elections, 
respectively. However, over the period of three years after election, stock returns’ of connected 
firms to the winner outperform stock returns’ of firms connected to the loser by 7.23% 
(significant at the 5% level). After four and five years, the impact is again insignificant. 
In sum, Table 9 highlights some influence of political connections on long-term stock 
returns. However, the impact is only most significant for a period of three years after the 
elections.      
7. ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS AND ROBUSTNESS CHECKS  
7.1.  ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS OF THE EVENT STUDY 
The focus of our analysis is on the three-day event window, from -1 to +1. As this event 
window specification is simply one among several possibilities, we reproduce our main result 
using two alternative windows (-2 to +2), and (0 to +2). In both cases we obtain sensibly similar 
results. 
In our paper, cumulated abnormal returns are estimated based on the one-factor market 
model around the election day (Day 0). The market model is estimated using daily data over a 
255-day (-315,-61) period. As a further check, we calculate the CARs using different methods, 
including the cumulative daily stock (raw) returns, Fama-French’s three-factor model (Fama and 
French, 1993), and the four-factor model (Carhart, 1997). We then use these CARs in our RDD 
regressions, as in Table 2. We find estimates mostly similar to those reported in Table 2, either 
including or excluding school fixed effects. Results are available upon request. 
7.2.  NONPARAMETRIC TESTS 
We further test the robustness of our result with nonparametric estimations, as described 
in section 2, using local cubic polynomial regressions, Gaussian kernels and a bandwidth of 
0.005. We find an estimated effect of 1.64%, significant at 1%. Figures 1A and 1B report the 
plots with 95%-confidence intervals, respectively with and without the bins containing 
observations, and with clear markers of bins above and below the threshold. They visualize the 
outcome variable, CAR(-1,+1), estimated as a nonparametric function of vote share, where each 
half of the graph represents the fitted function of vote shares greater or less than 50% (i.e. for 
elected or defeated politicians, respectively). The bands represent confidence intervals at 95%. 
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[Insert Figures 1A and 1B Here] 
We see a large gap at exactly 50% of vote share. Furthermore, visual evidence of an 
inverted “Z” shape of CAR with respect to vote share can be seen: as vote share increases 
around 50%, CAR first decreases, then jumps sharply at the threshold of 50%, and then 
decreases again. According to Cuñat, Gine, and Guadalupe’s (2012) event-based explanation, this 
Z shape is predictable in a model where the market internalizes available information before 
election and anticipates the gap at 50% if the prior probabilities of winning or losing are 
markedly different from 50%. 
However, the robustness of the Z shape depends on the relatively strong hypothesis that 
no confounding factors can possibly bias the non-parametric estimation in the whole range of 
vote shares between 48.5% and 52.5%. This hypothesis is not consistent with the further 
increase at around 52% vote share in the two figures. Such increase is likely due to cross-
sectional heterogeneities, coming from innate characteristics of elections with results at the level 
of 52%-48%, in traditional event studies, such heterogeneities could only be dealt with by 
controlling for observable characteristics. In contrast, RDD identification holds on the cross-
section of stocks, and thus does not require the strong hypothesis of no confounding factors. 
The RDD results can be sensitive to the choice of nonparametric specification, most 
importantly in terms of the bandwidth chosen in the nonparametric regression (Imbens and 
Kalyanaraman, 2012). We choose a prudent approach in using a wide range of bandwidths in our 
nonparametric estimation procedure. The results are shown in Figure 2.  
[Insert Figure 2 Here] 
The estimated effect remains stable, and always significant at 5%, across all choices of 
bandwidth. For our benchmark choice of 0.005, the effect is 1.64%; it slowly decreases towards 
1.37% for very large bandwidths, i.e. almost identical to the parametric results. For bandwidths 
smaller than 0.005, the estimate becomes noisier, but also much stronger. In sum, Figure 2 
clearly confirms the result that firms make significant gains in value following the elections of 
their connected governors. 
7.3. CHECKS OF RANDOMNESS 
As part of our regression discontinuity design, we check the near-randomness of winning 
or losing a close election induced by close elections for U.S. Senate and Congress between 1999 
and 2010, as highlighted by Lee (2008), and report supporting results in Table 10. Each column 
serves to show that a dependent variable's distribution is continuous at the cutoff point of 50% 
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vote share. These dependent variables are those used as control variable in Tables 1 to 5 in the 
main text.  
[Insert Table 10 Here] 
Panel A of Table 10 shows results for politicians’ characteristics, such as gender, age, 
incumbency, poll win margin, and party affiliation. We do not find any significant relationship 
between politicians’ characteristics and the win/loss dummy.  
Panel B of Table 10 reports regressions of director characteristics such as age, gender, 
and executive/nonexecutive role on the WinLose dummy. Similar to the results from Panel A, 
none of the regressions in Panel B provides significant estimates. 
Panel C of Table 10 shows regressions of state characteristics we have used in previous 
tables, such as regulation, economic freedom, government employment, and corruption on the 
win/loss dummy. We do not find any statistically significant estimates.  
Panel D exhibits regression results of different firm characteristics we have used in 
previous tables, such as firm size, leverage, and Tobin’s Q on the WinLose dummy. Again, none 
of them provide significant estimates.   
In summary, our randomness robustness checks show that our results are found only in 
specifications where the treatment matters, and not in tests with irrelevant event windows or 
irrelevant vote share thresholds. Consequently, political connection must be the causal factor 
behind these results. 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper investigates the impact of social network-based political connection on firm 
value. We use the Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD), a method that avoids endogeneity 
problems and errors in market beliefs, to identify the connection to a politician elected to be 
state’s governor in the U.S. in a closely contested race. The estimate of the Weighted Average 
Treatment Effect (WATE) during the period 1999 to 2010 shows an average positive and 
significant cumulative abnormal return of 1.36% surrounding the election date. The results are 
robust to various specifications, parametric and nonparametric, throughout different measures of 
outcome variables, with different definitions of social network, and across many subsamples. We 
also find that political connections are more valuable in a state with a higher level of regulation 
and corruption, in smaller firms, and in firms dependent on external finance. Firms connected to 
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election winners invest significantly more, earn better operating performance, hold more cash, 
and enjoy better long-term stock performance than do firms connected to the losers following 
the elections. 
Our contribution to finance literature is threefold. First, we propose a new approach to 
measure political connections based on social networks of candidates to governorship and 
directors of listed firms. This approach allows us to have a relatively sizable sample of U.S. firms 
for our study and to avoid obvious and specific connections. Second, we propose a solution to 
the identification problem. Our framework deals adequately with both the endogeneity of the 
connected politician and the selection bias in networks due to homophily, providing a powerful 
internal validity of the empirical results. Moreover, the estimated effect is a WATE across the 
sample of all politicians susceptible to experiencing a close election, and across sampled firms, 
which are comparable to Compustat’s universe. The findings are therefore also externally valid. 
That is, it is possible to generalize the conclusions to the population of all firms and politicians. 
Our third contribution is the finding of a consistent positive impact of political connections on 
firm value in the U.S. This result complements international evidence of the value of political 
connection from the existing literature (e.g., Fisman, 2001; Faccio, 2006; Faccio et al 2006), and 
enrich evidence from the U.S. (e.g. Goldman, Rocholl, and So, 2009). Our result is also 
consistent with recent evidence from Do et al. (2012) who find that firms lost benefits when the 
connected politician moves away from state politics, and who conjecture that political 
connections at local level should be very valuable.  
Overall, our study identifies the value of political connections through social networks in 
the United States and uncovers its variation across different states and firms. We provide 
evidence that political connections at the state level particularly enhance firm value.  
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ECONOMETRIC APPENDIX 
As shown by Lee and Lemieux (2010), suppose that the cumulative abnormal returns 
averaged over firms connected to a candidate i, CARi, is a function of the treatment variable, 
namely win/lose status, all observable characteristics Wi as well as unobservables Ui. The vote 
share of each candidate is also a function of Wi and unobservables Vi
Assume that conditional on W and U, the density of V is continuous. This assumption 
amounts to say that each candidate cannot fully determine the exact vote share (partial influence 
on vote share is still allowed.) Therefore 𝑓𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒|𝑊,𝑈(𝑥|𝑊,𝑈), the probability density of vote 
share conditional on W and U, is continuous. Then the joint distribution of W and U conditional 
on vote share is also continuous in vote share, since: 
Pr[𝑊 = 𝑤,𝑈 = 𝑢|𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 = 𝑥] = 𝑓𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒|𝑊,𝑈(𝑥|𝑊,𝑈) Pr [𝑊 = 𝑤,𝑈 = 𝑢]𝑓𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒(𝑥)  
 (while we assume linearity 
for simplicity, the results are much more general): 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝑊𝑖𝑛𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑒 𝑖𝛽 + 𝑊 𝑖𝛾 + 𝑈𝑖, 
𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖 = 𝑊𝑖𝛿 + 𝑉𝑖. 
Because of this continuity, all observed and unobserved predetermined characteristics 
will have identical distributions on either side of the threshold 𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 = 50%: lim
𝑥↓50%Pr[𝑊 = 𝑤,𝑈 = 𝑢|𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 = 𝑥] = lim𝑥↑50%Pr[𝑊 = 𝑤,𝑈 = 𝑢|𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 = 𝑥] 
We can thus define and estimate the treatment effect as: 
𝛽𝑅𝐷𝐷 ≝ lim
𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒↓50%𝐸(𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖|𝑊𝑖𝑛) − lim𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒↑50%𝐸(𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖|𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑒)= 𝐸(𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑊𝑖𝑛) − 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑒)|𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 = 50%). 
It can be estimated by approximating CARi
Moreover, if we let the effect be heterogeneous across observations, i.e., 𝛽(𝑊𝑖,𝑈𝑖) with 
𝑊𝑖 representing all observable and unobservable characteristics of each observation i, then the 
estimate can be rewritten as follows: 
𝛽𝑅𝐷𝐷 = �𝛽(𝑊,𝑈)𝑓(50%|𝑊,𝑈)𝑓(50%) 𝑑𝐺(𝑊,𝑈), 
 from both sides of the 50% threshold of 
vote share. This procedure controls for both observable and unobservable characteristics, using 
the observed vote share, not the vote share predicted by polls or markets (the observable part.) 
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where 𝐺(𝑊,𝑈) is the cumulative joint distribution of (W,U), and the weight 𝑓(50%|𝑊,𝑈)
𝑓(50%)  
represents the ex-ante likelihood of the characteristics (W,U) to produce a close election. 𝛽𝑅𝐷𝐷 is 
thus a Weighted Average Treatment Effect across all possible observations. 
34 
 
Figure 1A 
 
 
Figure 1B 
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Figure 2 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
            
             This table reports the descriptive statistics for our sample. Panel A shows the distribution of close gubernatorial elections at 5% vote 
margin by election year. Panel B shows characteristics of connected firms in our sample. We define a political connection as a link 
between a firm’s director and an election candidate who graduate from the same university program within a year. The market value of 
equity is the firm's market capitalization (in millions) measured at the fiscal year end. Common Equity is the firm's book value of equity 
(in millions). Market-to-Book Ratio is the ratio of the firm's market value of equity to book value of equity. Capital Expenditure is the 
firm's capital expenditure (in millions). Age is the firm's age. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets. Tobin's Q is the ratio of the 
sum of book value of total assets and market value of equity less book value of stockholders' common equity to total assets. Payout is the 
sum of dividends paid and shares repurchased (in millions). Tangibility is the ratio of net property, plant, and equipment to total assets. 
ROA is the ratio of operating income before depreciation to start-of-period total assets. R&D is the ratio of the firm's research and 
development expenditure to start-of-period total assets. Cash Reserve Ratio is the ratio of the firm's cash and short-term investments to 
start-of-the-period total assets. Panel C shows the time-series pattern of elections and firms for our sample. Panel D shows the 
distribution of degrees and graduation years of politicians and directors in our sample. 
 
A. Close Elections at 5% Vote Margin 
        
Election Year 
Number 
of 
Elections 
Average 
Margin 
   1999 1 0.011 
2000 3 0.026 
2002 11 0.028 
2003 1 0.039 
2004 4 0.024 
2006 3 0.025 
2008 1 0.035 
2009 1 0.038 
2010 10 0.019 
  35 0.027 
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B. Firm Characteristics 
           
           Sample Compustat Universe 
 
Min Mean Median Max SD 
 
Min Mean Median Maximum SD 
Market Cap (in $million) 7.61 2980.63 515.03 259906.49 16433.43 
 
0.01 2411.79 252.72 467092.88 11123.87 
Common Equity (in $million) 2.36 1170.82 201.17 52817.00 4687.69 
 
0.00 1039.54 120.49 224234.30 5554.22 
Market-to-Book Ratio 0.18 3.95 2.19 96.08 8.55 
 
0.00 4.79 1.96 7071.35 278.29 
Capital Expenditure (in $million) 0.00 113.18 11.17 8620.08 579.87 
 
0.00 147.54 6.66 39260.61 951.27 
Age 0.07 9.90 9.37 42.30 6.32 
 
0.00 8.32 7.17 61.71 6.50 
Leverage  0.00 0.26 0.22 0.97 0.25 
 
0.00 0.27 0.21 1.00 0.27 
Tobin's Q 0.32 2.03 1.47 16.37 1.67 
 
0.10 2.28 1.41 111.51 3.34 
Payout (in $million) 0.00 77.10 1.52 2079.58 248.87 
 
-112.08 76.20 0.22 16018.95 463.51 
Tangibility 0.00 0.19 0.11 0.88 0.21 
 
0.00 0.22 0.13 0.99 0.23 
ROA -2.31 -0.02 0.03 0.46 0.23 
 
-43.73 -0.06 0.02 6.22 0.48 
R&D 0.00 0.13 0.06 0.93 0.17 
 
-0.01 0.12 0.07 7.48 0.20 
Cash Reserve Ratio 0.00 0.27 0.18 0.96 0.26 
 
0.00 0.24 0.15 1.00 0.25 
 
C. Time Series (1999-2010) 
       
          Mean Median Minimum Maximum Q1 Q2 Stdev 
Elections per year 13.08 7 2 37 2.75 17.25 14.49 
Closed elections per year 2.92 1 0 11 0.75 3.25 3.78 
% of elections 21.28 27.15 0.00 50.00 6.25 33.33 16.98 
        Firms per year 63 24 1 268 7 46 95 
% of CRSP common stock universe 
         % of stocks 1.01 0.40 0.02 3.96 0.10 1.11 1.43 
  % of total market value 2.15 0.40 0.00 9.06 0.15 2.19 3.48 
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D. Distribution of Degrees and Graduation Years 
   Degree Politicians Directors 
Business School 5.88 6.02 
Graduate 5.88 0.86 
Ph.D. 2.94 1.37 
Law School 16.18 4.81 
Undergraduate 69.12 86.94 
   Graduation Years Politicians Directors 
<1950 0 19.77 
1950-59 0 0 
1960-69 17.65 23.71 
1970-79 63.24 46.56 
1980-89 17.65 9.79 
>=1990 1.46 0.17 
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Table 2: Political Connections and Firm Value in a Regression Discontinuity Design 
             This table reports OLS regressions of the Cumulative Abnormal Returns among the politically connected firms around close elections 
for U.S. governors between 1999 and 2010. A firm is connected to a politician if one of its directors shares the same educational 
background with a politician. Each observation pairs a firm’s director to the winner or the loser in a close election, who furthermore 
graduates from the same university program within a year (Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy, 2008). Average abnormal returns are estimated 
based on the market model around the election day (Day 0). The market model is estimated using daily data over a 255-day (-315,-61) 
period. The independent variable WinLose is an indicator that is equal to one if a firm is connected to the winner and to zero if a firm is 
connected to the loser in a close election.. A close election is specified by the margin of votes between the top two candidates, with a 
5% margin referring to the subsample of elections with less than 5% vote margin. Vote Share (Winners) and Vote Share (Losers) refer to 
the vote shares of winners and vote shares of losers, respectively. Column 4 controls for dummy variables representing election 
characteristics (year, state, election turnout of the politician involved, etc.). Column 5 controls for dummy variables representing 
politicians’ characteristics (gender, age, party's affiliation, and election turnout of the politician involved.) Column 6 controls for firm 
characteristics (market value, Tobin's Q, return on asset, and leverage.) Columns 7, 8, and 9 control, respectively, for year, school, and 
industry fixed effects. Column 10 controls for pre-election poll prediction. Column 11 includes observations whose poll margin is within 
5%. Column 12 excludes observations with CAR of 30% or higher. Standard errors in square brackets are corrected for clustering by 
politicians in each election. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
                          
 
Dependent Variables: CAR (-1,1)   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Subsample 1% Margin 3% Margin 5% Margin 5% Margin 5% Margin 5% Margin 5% Margin 5% Margin 5% Margin 5% Margin Poll Margin<=5% 
Outliers 
Excluded 
                          
WinLose 0.0323 0.017705 0.0136 0.0163 0.0148 0.0176 0.0125 0.0138 0.0154 0.0126 0.0184 0.0166 
 
[0.00560]*** [.006478 ]*** [0.00560]** [0.00620]** [0.00605]** [0.00509]** [0.00575]** [0.00429]*** [0.00570]*** [0.00622]** [0.00711]** [0.00548]*** 
             
Vote Share 
(Winners) & 
Vote Share 
(Losers) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
             
Controls    
Election 
Controls 
Politician 
Controls 
Firm 
Controls Year FE School FE Industry FE 
Poll 
Prediction   
             R-squared 0.026 0.014 0.005 0.040 0.063 0.019 0.017 0.110 0.070 0.005 0.009 0.007 
Observations 167 378 586 586 586 525 586 586 571 532 338 583 
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Table 3: Politicians’ Characteristics and the Value of Political Connections 
              This table reports OLS regressions of the Cumulative Abnormal Returns among the politically connected firms around close elections 
for U.S. governors between 1999 and 2010. A firm is connected to a politician if one of its directors shares the same educational 
backgrounds with a politician. Each observation pairs a firm’s director to the winner or the loser in a close election, who furthermore 
graduates from the same university program within a year (Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy, 2008). Average abnormal returns are estimated 
based on the market model around the election day (Day 0). The market model is estimated using daily data over a 255-day (-315,-61) 
period. The independent variable WinLose is an indicator that is equal to one if a firm is connected to the winner and to zero if a firm is 
connected to the loser in a close election. A close election is specified by the margin of votes between the top two candidates being less 
than 5%. Vote Share (Winners) and Vote Share (Losers) refer to the vote shares of winners and vote shares of losers, respectively. 
Columns 1 to 7 show, respectively, results on the subsamples of incumbents, challenger candidates, challenger-only election candidates, 
non-executive directors, executive directors, Democratic candidates, and Republican candidates. Columns 8 to 9 examine subsamples 
of institutions that are the alma mater of less or more than 32 individuals (sample's median) in the sample. Columns 10 and 11 report 
regression results on candidates from the federal offices, and not from federal offices, respectively. Standard errors in square brackets 
are corrected for clustering by politicians in each election. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
                        
 
Dependent Variables: CAR (-1,1)     
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Subsample Incumbent Challenger 
Challenger-
only 
elections 
Non-
Executive 
Director 
Executive Democrats Republicans Small Networks 
Large 
Networks 
From 
Federal 
Offices 
Not From 
Federal 
Offices 
                        
WinLose 0.0190 0.0122 0.0146 0.0136 0.00551 0.0201 0.00182 0.0222 0.0082 0.0356 0.0132 
 
[0.00446]*** [0.00542]** [0.00601]** [0.00454]*** [0.0181] [0.00938]** [0.00505] [0.00898]** [0.00317]** [0.0143]** [0.00732]* 
            Vote Share 
(Winners) & 
Vote Share 
(Losers) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
            R-squared 0.094 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.020 0.004 0.002 0.009 0.0021 0.022 0.003 
Observations 58 528 469 477 109 318 197 336 250 92 436 
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Table 4: State's Regulation, Corruption, Institution Quality, and the Value of Political Connections 
             This table reports OLS regressions of the Cumulative Abnormal Returns among the politically connected firms around close 
governorship elections in the U.S. between 1999 and 2010. Each observation pairs a firm’s director to the winner or the loser in a close 
election, who furthermore graduates from the same university program within a year (Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy, 2008). Average 
abnormal returns are estimated based on the market model around the election day (Day 0). The market model is estimated using daily 
data over a 255-day (-315,-61) period. The independent variable WinLose is an indicator that is equal to one if a firm is connected to the 
winner and to zero if a firm is connected to the loser in a close election. A close election is specified by the margin of votes between the 
top two candidates being less than 5%. Vote Share (Winners) and Vote Share (Losers) refer to the vote shares of winners and vote 
shares of losers, respectively. Columns 1 to 12 show, respectively, results on the subsamples of above or below median of the following 
measures: the index of regulation by state based on Clemson University’s Report on Economic Freedom, available at 
http://freedom.clemson.edu; the index of economic freedom by state from Heritage Foundation; the size of government employment; 
corruption conviction rate in 2000 (Glaeser and Saks, 2006); corruption news (Saiz and Simonsohn, 2008); and GCISC 1970 score 
(population concentration around the state capital, Campante and Do, 2012). Standard errors in square brackets are corrected for 
clustering by politicians in each election. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
                  
    
 
Dependent Variables: CAR (-1,1) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Subsample High Regulation 
Low 
Regulation 
Low 
Economic 
Freedom 
1999 
High 
Economic 
Freedom 
1999 
High 
Government 
Employment 
Low 
Government 
Employment 
More 
Corrupt 
State 
Less 
Corrupt 
State 
More 
Corruption 
News 
Less 
Corruption 
News 
Low GCISC High GCISC 
                          
WinLose 0.0100 0.0291 0.0482 0.00684 0.0300 0.000885 0.0186 0.00405 0.0228 -0.0120 0.0259 0.00999 
 
[0.00380]** [0.0170] [0.0193]** [0.00467] [0.00779]*** [0.00720] [0.00548]*** [0.0121] [0.00746]*** [0.0101] [0.00595]*** [0.00636] 
             
Vote Share 
(Winners) & 
Vote Share 
(Losers) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
             R-squared 0.004 0.012 0.023 0.006 0.015 0.011 0.009 0.021 0.010 0.020 0.010 0.007 
Observations 428 158 137 449 306 280 319 267 329 257 150 436 
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Table 5: Firm characteristics and the Value of Political Connections 
           This table reports the pooled OLS regressions of the Cumulative Abnormal Returns among the politically connected firms around close 
elections for U.S. governors between 1999 and 2010. Each observation pairs a firm’s director to the winner or the loser in a close 
election, who furthermore graduates from the same university program within a year (Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy, 2008). Average 
abnormal returns are estimated based on the market model around the election day (Day 0). The market model is estimated using daily 
data over a 255-day (-315,-61) period. The independent variable WinLose is an indicator that is equal to one if a firm is connected to the 
winner and to zero if a firm is connected to the loser in a close election. A close election is specified by the margin of votes between the 
top two candidates being less than 5%. Vote Share (Winners) and Vote Share (Losers) refer to the vote shares of winners and vote 
shares of losers, respectively. Columns 1 to 4 show, respectively, results on the subsamples of below or above the median of market 
capitalization and reliance on external finance (Rajan and Zingales, 1998), respectively. Columns 5 and 6 use the subsamples in the 
cross-section of size (below or above median market capitalization) and corruption index based on conviction rate in 2000 (Glaeser and 
Saks, 2006). Columns 7 and 8 show, respectively, results on subsamples of firms with no activities or some firm activities in a given state 
in a given year, measured by the number of times a firms is reported in local newspapers normalized by the number of search hits for 
the neutral keyword "September” (Saiz and Simonsohn, 2008). Columns 9 and 10 show, respectively, results on subsamples of firms with 
below and above abnormal trading activity (Campbell and Wasley, 1996). *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 
1%, respectively. 
,                  
  
 
Dependent Variables: CAR (-1,1) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Subsample 
Higher 
Market 
Cap 
Lower 
Market 
Cap 
Rely on 
External 
Finance 
Not Rely on 
External 
Finance 
Lower Market 
Cap, More 
Corrupted 
Higher Market 
Cap, More 
Corrupted 
No State-Level 
Firm Activities 
Prior to Election 
Some State-Level 
Firm Activities 
Prior to Election 
Abnormal 
Trading 
Activity <=0 
Abnormal 
Trading 
Activity >0 
              
    WinLose 0.0163 0.0122 0.0156 0.00694 0.0295 0.00540 0.00719 0.0146 0.00107 0.0214 
 
[0.0101] [0.00636]* [0.00755]** [0.0101] [0.00633]*** [0.00620] [0.0126] [0.00685]** [0.00815] [0.00909]** 
           Vote Share 
(Winners) & 
Vote Share 
(Losers) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
   
R-squared 0.008 0.016 0.008 0.013 0.013 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.023 0.023 
Observations 331 255 441 145 178 141 177 409 288 298 
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Table 6: Political Connections and Post-Election Corporate Investments 
        This table reports OLS regressions of the change in firm investing activities among the 
politically connected firms around close elections for U.S. governors between 1999 and 2010. 
Each observation pairs a firm’s director to the winner or the loser in a close election, who 
furthermore graduates from the same university program within a year (Cohen, Malloy, and 
Frazzini, 2008). Firm investing activities in a given year are measured as the sum of a firm's 
capital expenditure and research and development normalized by property, plant, and 
equipment (PP&E) in start of the year. The independent variable WinLose is an indicator that is 
equal to one if a firm is connected to the winner and to zero if a firm is connected to the loser in 
a close election. A close election is specified by the margin of votes between the top two 
candidates being less than 5%. Vote Share (Winners) and Vote Share (Losers) refer to the vote 
shares of winners and vote shares of losers, respectively. Columns 1 to 7 show, respectively, the 
results with windows of one year before to five years after the election year. Standard errors in 
square brackets are corrected for clustering by politicians in each election. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
                
  Dependent Variables: Change in Firm Investing Activities 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Relative Year (-2,-1) (-1,0) (0,1) (1,2) (2,3) (3,4) (4,5) 
                
WinLose -0.085 -0.222 0.344 -0.149 0.134 -0.416 0.427 
 
[0.186] [0.157] [0.122]*** [0.169] [0.085] [0.211]* [0.142]*** 
        Vote Share 
(Winners) & 
Vote Share 
(Losers) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
       
Controls State FE 
State 
FE State FE 
State 
FE 
State 
FE 
State 
FE State FE 
        R-squared 0.072 0.094 0.086 0.113 0.154 0.103 0.217 
Observations 445 459 272 234 210 202 177 
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Table 7: Political Connections and Post-Election Return on Assets 
        This table reports OLS regressions of the change in firm operating return on assets among 
the politically connected firms around close elections for U.S. governors between 1999 and 
2010. Each observation pairs a firm’s director to the winner or the loser in a close election, 
who furthermore graduates from the same university program within a year (Cohen, 
Frazzini, and Malloy, 2008). Firm operating return on assets are measured as operating 
income before depreciation (OIBDP) normalized by total assets in start of the year. The 
independent variable WinLose is an indicator that is equal to one if a firm is connected to 
the winner and to zero if a firm is connected to the loser in a close election. A close election 
is specified by the margin of votes between the top two candidates being less than 5%. Vote 
Share (Winners) and Vote Share (Losers) refer to the vote shares of winners and vote shares 
of losers, respectively. Columns 1 to 7 show, respectively, the results with windows of one 
year before to five years after the election year. Standard errors in square brackets are 
corrected for clustering by politicians in each election. *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
          Dependent Variables: Change in Operating Return on Assets 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Relative Year (-2,-1) (-1,0) (0,1) (1,2) (2,3) (3,4) (4,5) 
                
WinLose 0.0911 -0.107 -0.120 -0.155 0.314 0.256 0.337 
 
[0.0964] [0.157] [0.204] [0.198] [0.370] [0.118]** [0.125]** 
        Vote Share 
(Winners) & 
Vote Share 
(Losers) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
       
Controls State FE State FE State FE State FE 
State 
FE State FE State FE 
        R-squared 0.085 0.091 0.061 0.052 0.117 0.116 0.067 
Observations 496 506 350 275 251 238 214 
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Table 8: Political Connections and Corporate Cash Holding 
        This table reports OLS regressions of the change in a firm's cash reserve ratio among the 
politically connected firms around close elections for U.S. governors between 1999 and 
2010. Each observation pairs a firm’s director to the winner or the loser in a close election, 
who furthermore graduates from the same university program within a year (Cohen, 
Frazzini, and Malloy, 2008). The firm's cash reserve ratio in a given year is measured as the 
cash balance normalized by total assets. The independent variable WinLose is an indicator 
that is equal to one if a firm is connected to the winner and to zero if a firm is connected 
to the loser in a close election. A close election is specified by the margin of votes between 
the top two candidates being less than 5%. Vote Share (Winners) and Vote Share (Losers) 
refer to the vote shares of winners and vote shares of losers, respectively. Columns 1 to 7 
show, respectively, the results with windows of one year before to five years after the 
election year. Standard errors in square brackets are corrected for clustering by politicians 
in each election. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. 
                
  Dependent Variables: Change in Firm Cash Reserve  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Relative Year (-2,-1) (-1,0) (0,1) (1,2) (2,3) (3,4) (4,5) 
                
WinLose 0.123 0.382 0.0816 -0.0239 0.880 0.933 -0.836 
 
[0.126] [0.186]** [0.138] [0.149] [0.226]*** [0.218]*** [0.957] 
        Vote Share 
(Winners) and 
Vote Share 
(Losers) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
       
Controls State FE State FE State FE State FE State FE State FE State FE 
        R-squared 0.042 0.132 0.080 0.078 0.091 0.045 0.143 
Observations 530 547 383 285 260 248 226 
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Table 9: Political Connections and Long Term Stock Performance 
       This table reports OLS regressions of the long-run cumulative raw returns among the politically 
connected firms around close elections for U.S. governors between 1999 and 2010. Each 
observation pairs a firm’s director to the winner or the loser in a close election, who furthermore 
graduates from the same university program within a year (Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy, 2008). 
Raw stock returns are cumulated over various time horizons. The independent variable WinLose 
is an indicator that is equal to one if a firm is connected to the winner and to zero if a firm is 
connected to the loser in a close election. A close election is specified by the margin of votes 
between the top two candidates being less than 5%. Vote Share (Winners) and Vote Share 
(Losers) refer to the vote shares of winners and vote shares of losers, respectively. Columns 1 to 6 
show, respectively, the results with windows of six months before to five years after the election 
year. Standard errors in square brackets are corrected for clustering by politicians in each 
election. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
         Dependent Variables: Long-run Cumulative Raw Returns 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Relative Year (-6,0) (1,12) (1,24) (1,36) (1,48) (1,60) 
              
WinLose 0.0329 0.0116 -0.0137 0.0723 0.0521 -0.0125 
 
[0.0260] [0.0287] [0.0254] [0.0303]** [0.0362] [0.0189] 
       Vote Share 
(Winners) & 
Vote Share 
(Losers) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
      
Controls State FE State FE State FE State FE State FE State FE 
       R-squared 0.157 0.198 0.255 0.314 0.377 0.124 
Observations 572 553 295 285 254 248 
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Table 10: RDD Randomness Checks 
 
This table reports robustness checks of the near-randomness of the win/lose treatment induced 
by close elections for U.S. Senate and Congress between 2000 and 2008. Each observation pairs a 
firm’s director to the winner or the loser in a close election, who furthermore graduates from the 
same university program within a year (Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy, 2008). The independent 
variable WinLose is an indicator that is equal to one if a firm is connected to the winner and to 
zero if a firm is connected to the loser in a close election. A close election is specified by the 
margin of votes between the top two candidates being less than 5%. Vote Share (Winners) and 
Vote Share (Losers) refer to the vote shares of winners and vote shares of losers, respectively. Each 
column serves to show that a dependent variable's distribution is continuous at the cutoff point of 
50% vote share. These dependent variables are those used as control variable in Tables 1- 5 in the 
main text. Panel A shows results for politicians’ characteristics (gender, age, incumbency, win 
margin, and party affiliation.) Panel B report results on director characteristics (director age, 
gender and executive/nonexecutive role, and social network size.) Panel C displays results with 
state characteristics (regulations, corruptions, etc.). Panel D reports regressions with firm 
characteristics (financial dependence, size, network size, etc.). Standard errors in square brackets 
are corrected for clustering by politicians in each election. *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
       Panel A: Politician Characteristics 
              
Dependent 
Variable: 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Pol. 
Gender Pol. Age Log(Turnout) Incumbency 
Poll Margin 
Of Victory 
Party 
Affiliation 
              
WinLose -0.156 3.617 0.0487 0.131 -0.00173 -1.021 
 
[0.195] [3.729] [0.237] [0.229] [0.00911] [0.688] 
      
Vote Share 
(Winners) & 
Vote Share 
(Losers) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       R-squared 0.086 0.028 0.032 0.037 0.002 0.096 
Observations 51 51 51 51 48 51 
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B. Director Characteristics 
          
Dependent 
Variable: 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Director's Gender Director's Age Executive Directorship 
Log(Count of 
Institution) 
          
WinLose 0.0172 3.751 0.0805 -0.755 
 
[0.0805] [2.945] [0.0749] [0.737] 
     Vote Share 
(Winners) & 
Vote Share 
(Losers) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
    
R-squared 0.015 0.090 0.011 0.042 
Observations 439 433 439 439 
 
C. State Characteristics 
              
Dependent 
Variable: 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Regulation Economic Freedom 
Government 
Employment Corruption 
Corruption 
News GCISC1970 
              
WinLose 0.0743 -0.104 0.000169 -0.0342 -5.605 -0.0690 
 
[0.309] [0.466] [0.00994] [0.0561] [10.52] [0.0700] 
       
Vote Share 
(Winners) & 
Vote Share 
(Losers) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
      
R-squared 0.054 0.066 0.080 0.076 0.115 0.044 
Observations 586 586 586 586 572 581 
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D. Firm Characteristics 
                               
Dependent 
Variable: 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Market 
Capitalization 
Dependence 
on External 
Finance 
Log(HQ-
Capital 
Distance) 
Firm 
Activities 
Prior to 
Election 
Log(Book 
Value of 
Equity) 
Leverage Tobin’s Q 
Cash 
Reserve 
Ratio 
Log(Payout) Tangibility 
                      
WinLose 0.0337 -0.152 0.554 -0.0437 0.0443 -0.0241 0.111 -0.0254 0.127 0.0282 
 
[0.344] [0.194] [0.380] [0.0971] [0.344] [0.0379] [0.242] [0.0548] [0.453] [0.0351] 
           Vote Share 
(Winners) & 
Vote Share 
(Losers) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
          R-squared 0.013 0.014 0.023 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.004 0.009 0.000 0.001 
Observations 586 575 576 586 528 547 552 552 331 531 
 
 
